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Abstract: This qualitative study explored the understandings of people with a university education in science and those 
without a university science background about the evidence base relating to Complementary and Alternative Medicine - a 
controversial multibillion-dollar industry on a global scale. The findings indicated that science- trained and non-science-
trained respondents alike valued scientific rigor and testing in relation to health care but also used subjective kinds of 
evidence in justifying their views and decisions about CAMS. In addition, both science and humanities graduates 
engaged with evidence in similar ways as defined by ‘habits of mind’. These findings are discussed in relation to their 
implications for science education and engagement with scientific ideas, including scientific literacy and the belief 
systems that people bring to their understanding of science. 
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Introduction 
here have been numerous advances in medical treatments worldwide over the last fifty 
years, with extraordinary successes in the eradication of diseases previously resulting in 
the deaths of millions of people (Andre et al. 2008). Much of this success is attributed to 
the scientific basis of modern medical treatments, particularly the development of 
evidence-based medicine (EBM) and drugs that are rigorously evaluated (Schlipköter and 
Flahault 2010). Citizens in developed Western countries are exposed to unprecedented levels of 
science education, and this might be expected to lead to choice of medical treatments supported 
by scientific evidence - but the literature suggests this is not always the case. In many Western 
societies there is something of a controversial backlash against modern medicine, with some 
advocating medical treatments outside mainstream Western scientific-based treatment.  
In this study we explore the views of highly educated science and non-science trained 
Western adults on some health treatments that are outside the mainstream in Western medicine: 
specifically hypnotherapy, homeopathy, aromatherapy, naturopathy and traditional Chinese and 
Indian health treatments. We are here referring to these treatments collectively as complementary 
and alternative medicines (CAMs). In doing this we acknowledge the differences between them, 
that these treatments may be alternative and/or complementary only in contexts outside their 
traditional use, and that the range of definitions of CAMS can include a much wider range of 
treatments than being considered here and span much broader conceptions of integrated, 
wholistic health management.  
The rationale for this study is twofold. First, there is a need to research public engagement 
with both the claims of CAM advocates, and the scientific evidence base for the efficacy of 
CAMs (Baugniet et al. 2000; Trevelyan 1996). This is necessary, it is argued in the present work, 
because many claims of CAM proponents are contentious, and have implications for people’s 
health care decisions. According to some authors, use of CAMs has the potential to undermine 
well-established (and highly successful) public health and national health funding policies in 
Western contexts (e.g., Singh and Ernst 2008). Debates about the claims of CAMs versus 
scientific-based medical treatments will persist, especially given the pressure on public health 
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budgets and the need to limit what health interventions to fund. Hence, exploring people’s views 
about evidence claims in relation to CAMs has the potential to inform discussion about this issue. 
The second reason for conducting the study is to contribute to our understanding of scientific 
literacy, and we suggest here that CAM use is an interesting example of a socio-scientific issue 
(SSI) that can provide insights into people’s scientific literacy. In an article exploring scientists’ 
habits of mind in relation to religious beliefs, Coll, Taylor and Lay (2009) posed the question of 
whether scientists really think in different ways to non-experts. This extremely important 
question, relating as it does to the impact of science education on people’s reasoning and use of 
evidence and decision-making, remains unresolved. We suggest that the way science and non-
science trained adults engage with evidence warrants further research.  
 
Scope and research questions 
This study thus explores the views of highly educated Western adults with access to both 
CAMs and EBM, on the use of these particular CAMs. We are focusing within a Western 
context; and using a well-educated sample as users of CAMs in Western countries are typically 
highly educated (Harris, Cooper, Relton and Thomas 2012). This study seeks to examine what 
evidence is used, and how it is used, to inform decision-making about CAM use (or lack thereof) 
by two cohorts of participants – those with a university education in science, and those with a 
university education in the humanities. 
The research questions guiding this study are: 
• What kinds of evidence do people with a university education in science compared 
to people without university science training invoke in justifying their views of 
CAMs? 
• How do people with university education in science, compared to people without 
university science training, engage with the evidence they invoke? 
Literature Review 
Given the research questions and rationale outlined above, three bodies of literature are reviewed. 
These relate to the reasons why people use CAMs, what constitutes evidence in relation to 
CAMs, and literature on scientific literacy. 
Why People use CAMs 
Some educated Westerners choose CAMs over modern medical scientific-based treatments, 
even in the face of what the medical profession views as incontrovertible evidence of successful 
mainstream treatment options (Passarelli 2008). Advocates of such CAMs often see modern 
treatments as highly invasive, or fear the side effects of drugs – chemotherapy with its dramatic 
side effects being an exemplar (Joseph et al. 2012). In any cohort of society there will be some 
who, as a result of mistrust of authority figures (e.g., as a consequence of well-publicized 
medical disasters like thalidomide), might want to go their own way. Equally, if a cancer patient 
is told there are no available treatment options left, a perfectly rational choice might be to try 
CAMs. The popularity of CAMs has also been attributed in part to patient dissatisfaction with the 
evidence-based biomedical model of health care. Some CAM advocates argue evidence-based 
medicine (EBM) does not address the subjective components of human experience essential to 
good health, and fails to consider health from a more humanistic viewpoint (Goldenberg 2006). 
Studies reviewed by Thompson and Feder (2005) suggest that people turn to CAMs because of 
persistent symptoms and concerns about side effects of conventional medicines, and favour a less 
invasive approach to their health care. 
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Literature suggests CAM users hold a wholistic view of health, are less healthy than non-
users, and view CAMs as congruent with their broader personal values and belief systems (Astin 
1998). Furthermore, two large-scale international surveys report that a strong predictor of belief 
in CAM is belief in magic and the paranormal (Lindeman 2010; Saher and Lindeman 2005). 
These studies suggest CAMs might be attractive to people with a preference for intuitive thinking 
activated by personal experience. The authors argue that any increase in rational health 
knowledge would probably be held in conjunction with, rather than replace, intuitive knowledge 
that is resistant to change. In a more recent large study, Stoneman, Sturgis, Allum and Sibley 
(2013) identified a large sub-group characterised by what they termed a ‘dissonant’ orientation, 
which was optimistic and supportive of conventional medicine and science, yet also believed in 
the efficacy of homeopathy.  
Evidence Claims 
The heart of the debate about the use of CAMs seems to lie in disagreement about their efficacy. 
Proponents argue it is more holistic in nature and often as effective, or more effective, than 
science-based medical treatments (see, e.g., Trevelyan 1996). It does appear that CAM advocates 
and the established medical system hold different views as to what constitutes ‘evidence’. There 
seems to be a mismatch between the widespread use of CAMs and the scientific EBM approach 
that is communicated as the central plank of official health policy in many countries. A recent 
meta-analysis of CAMs reported that 50% of adults and 20% of children in Australia reportedly 
had used a CAM previously, and about 25% of adults had consulted CAM practitioners (Harris, 
Cooper, Relton, and Thomas 2012). Figures were slightly lower in the US but reported CAM use 
was still high (40% adults and 11% of children), and also high in the UK (25% of adults). These 
data suggest the use of CAM is quite widespread, despite concerns of public sector medical 
authorities.  
The issue as whether or not someone should use CAMs is clouded by what appears to be 
mixed messages from health authorities. As an illustration, whilst the medical profession 
ostensibly opposes the use of CAM, in the UK the British National Health Service (NHS) has 
approved the public funding of homeopathy – albeit not without controversy (House of 
Commons Science & Technology Committee 2010). This type of debate is widespread, and in 
Australia, for example, nearly AUD$69 million has been spent since 1991 on research into the 
effectiveness of CAMs, and the current strategic plan of the Australian National Health and 
Medical Research Council (2012) includes examination of alternative therapy claims.  
Hence, the debate about evidence claims for CAMs should not be seen as a simple argument 
about who is right and who is wrong, and how we might change the mind of an ill-informed 
public; health authorities themselves are actively engaged in debates of CAM use versus 
scientific-based medical treatments. It is, then, a genuine SSI with potentially dramatic 
implications, and with profound implications for science education.  
Use of Evidence in Decision-making about CAM Use 
Of central importance in discussion of health decisions, treatments and medicines in relation to 
CAM is what constitutes evidence. How do people engage with evidence to make health 
decisions and on what basis should they use various treatments? Kolstø (2001, 302) says that 
science values evidence that is ‘public, inter-subjective and open to validation’, particularly 
statistical evidence establishing causal relationships.  
The past few decades have seen a dramatic rise in the use of scientific EBM, with treatment 
decisions nowadays based on highly codified systems such as the Oxford Levels of Evidence 
(Howick et al. 2011). This hierarchy of evidence explicitly prioritizes (preferably multiple) 
randomized, controlled trials as the so-called Gold Standard of evidence, followed by cohort 
studies, case series and mechanistic reasoning (Yore et al. 2007). 
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Evidence-based medicine underpins the funding and provision of health care in many 
developed countries. For example, although homeopathy is currently (and contentiously) funded 
by the NHS in the UK, a recent inquiry argued for its removal from the NHS on the basis of 
‘insufficient evidence’ (i.e., using EBM principles) for its effectiveness (House of Commons 
Science & Technology Committee 2010). Similarly, the Australian Medical Association (2012) 
has argued that CAMs should only be funded if their safety and efficacy is established by EBM 
approaches. 
As might be expected, this conception of evidence and the hegemony of EBM has been 
criticized by CAM advocates, who raise philosophical objections to its epistemological 
foundations (see e.g., Barry 2006; Goldenberg 2006, 2010; Loughlin, Upshur, Goldenberg, 
Bluhm, and Borgerson 2010; Upshur, Van Den Kerkhof, and Goel 2001). To counter some of the 
criticisms leveled at the what opponents consider a narrowly focused definition of ‘evidence’ in 
EBM, a broader taxonomy of what counts as health-related ‘evidence’ has been proposed 
(Upshur et al. 2001), which includes qualitative evidence at both personal and general levels. 
Goldenberg (2006, 2630) condemns the authority of scientific evidence and clinical trials that are 
the hallmark of the EBM movement as ‘the latest expression of ‘‘scientism’’, modernity’s 
rationalist dream that science can produce the knowledge required to emancipate us from 
scarcity, ignorance, and error’. Goldenberg says that the complex social process of health care 
decision-making cannot be rationalized, that patient’s individual self-understanding and 
experiences comprise a legitimate source of relevant medical knowledge and that modern health 
care should rely on ‘diverse notions of evidence’ reflecting humanities and social science 
traditions as well as those from the pure and natural sciences. In a similar vein, Barry (2006, 
2646) contends that CAMs by their very nature are not amenable to evaluation by randomized 
trials, and advocates the acceptance and use of anthropological forms of evidence such as 
‘transcendent, transformational experiences; changing lived-body experience; and the gaining of 
meaning’. These ‘experiences’ as a form of evidence do not sit well with the validity and 
reliability concerns of EBM. 
In summary, the literature reveals two antithetical arguments about what should count as 
evidence on which to base health care decisions and use of CAMs. These are the scientific 
evidence-based approach privileging double-blind trials and similar codified and systematic 
methods, and an explicitly non-scientific approach based on experiential and individual kinds of 
evidence.  
Theoretical Basis to the Inquiry: Socio-Scientific Issues, Scientific Literacy, Scientific 
Attitude, & Scientific Habits of Mind  
Earlier we suggested that CAMs usage is an example of a socio-scientific issue (Çalik et al. 
2013). Such issues fall into two broad types: those where a relevant professional group feels the 
debate is settled and the problem is public lack of understanding about the issue or evidence 
claims; and a second category of issues where there is not necessarily a clear path forward. We 
argue here that the use of CAMs falls into the first category; with the odd exception noted above 
much of the medical profession does not support the use of CAMs in place of EBM treatment.  
The capacity to engage in debates about SSIs is a component of scientific literacy (Laugksch 
2000), which is a key goal of science education worldwide (Coll and Taylor 2009). A precise 
definition of scientific literacy is yet to be agreed, but Dillon (2009), drawing upon the work of 
Roberts, indicates there are two broad conceptualizations or visions of scientific literacy: Vision I 
that looks inward at science itself (its products such as laws and theories, and its processes such 
as hypothesizing and experimenting), and Vision II which looks outward at situations in which 
science has a role, such as decision-making about socio-scientific issues (Roberts 2007b, 9). It is 
this latter vision that underpins the present work, because of its links to SSIs. 
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We have argued above that the kinds of evidence that people use in health care decisions are 
important, but here we posit that how people engage with and process that evidence is also a 
crucial part of the picture. This we believe is related to the nature of science (NOS) – something 
the literature notes as a crucial component of scientific literacy (see e.g., Dillon 2009; Laugksch 
2000; Roberts 2007a,b). Like scientific literacy, the literature on NOS is vast, but most 
commentators say to achieve an understanding of NOS requires people to have some knowledge 
of how scientists accrue evidence or data, how they interpret data, and how they reach and justify 
conclusions (Lederman, Abd-El-Khalick, Bell, and Schwartz 2002). Coll and Taylor (2004), 
along with Coll, Taylor and Lay (2008) suggest that understanding how scientists think is a key 
element of NOS, and thereby scientific literacy. Gauld (1982, 2005) provides an interesting 
insight into scientific thinking. In his critical review of the literature, he coined the term 
‘scientific attitude’, which he defined as scientific thinking where ‘no idea, conclusion, decision 
or solution is accepted just because a particular person makes a claim, but is treated sceptically 
until its soundness can be judged according to the weight of evidence which is relevant to it 
[added emphasis]’ (Gauld 1982, 110).  
This scientific attitude, Gauld (2005) says, arises from what he referred to as ‘scientific 
habits of mind’ (SHOM). The extent to which these habits of mind are the specific or sole 
provenance of people with a strong scientific education has been raised in the literature. Gauld 
(2005) himself suggested that ‘scientific’ habits of mind are not necessarily peculiar to science, 
but are common to all scholarly activity. This is supported by Çalik and Coll (2012), who 
contend that these habits of mind are important for everyone in negotiating the increasing range 
of socio-scientific issues in our lives. 
In summary, the literature indicates many modern citizens report the use of CAMs, and that 
there is a need to better understand the reasons why people choose to use or not use CAMs. The 
work reported here draws upon SHOM to evaluate evidence claims that people use when making 
choices about health care. 
Methods 
To investigate the research questions relating to kinds of evidence that people trained in science 
vs. the humanities at a tertiary level invoke in justifying their views of CAMs, and the ways in 
which they engage with this evidence, this study employed an idiographic focus on individuals’ 
subjective experiences and thoughts relating to CAMs. We adopted a qualitative methodology 
using one-to-one in-depth interviews to explore and report the richness and variation in 
individual participants’ perspectives. 
The study involved a purposeful sample of participants selected on the basis of their science 
background (or lack thereof). The sample comprised 25 tertiary-educated participants; 16 
participants with tertiary education to at least Bachelor’s level in a science field (9 male, 7 
female) and who were employed as secondary and tertiary level teachers and 9 participants who 
had no science education beyond high school, but held at least Bachelor’s degrees in the 
humanities (4 male, 5 female). This group also comprised secondary and tertiary teachers. The 
participants were 22–60 years old, and came from different educational institutions in Australia, 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom (Table 1). The sample and nature of this inquiry precludes 
generalisation; the intention here is to use qualitative means of inquiry to provide an in-depth 
understanding of complex issues (Lincoln, Lyneham and Guba 2011; Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
 
Table 1 here 
 
Interview Protocol 
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A 22-item list of propositions was given to participants prior to the interviews, comprising 
statements such as ‘There is good evidence that homeopathy can cure serious illnesses’ and ‘The 
same standards used to evaluate the effectiveness and side effects of medical drugs should be 
applied to herbal medicines and other alternative medicines’. Participants indicated the extent to 
which they thought these propositions were true by circling one of four response codes ranging 
from ‘almost certainly untrue’ to ‘almost certainly true’ in a Likert-type format. This step was 
used solely as a trigger for subsequent discussion (hence we have not numerically summarized 
the data – see Coll and Taylor 2004), as we asked participants to talk through and explain their 
views to solicit rich qualitative data. The interviews were audiotaped and transcribed verbatim. 
Data Analysis 
The interview transcripts were coded manually, and a conceptually clustered matrix was 
constructed (Maykut and Morehouse 1994). Verbatim responses to each interview question were 
inserted into a different sheet of a single Excel workbook, using participants’ names and 
coding/memo keys as additional headings. The data file was read through multiple times in an 
iterative process, using different perspectives to detect and scrutinise emerging themes. 
For each proposition in the interview schedule, the data were coded in relation to two broad 
themes relating directly to the research questions: 
 
Theme 1: The kinds of evidence that each participant invoked in support of their views. 
 
Theme 2: The different habits of mind, as described by Çalik and Coll (2012), apparent in 
responses of each participant to that proposition. 
 
Once coding was complete, the codes were compared across science and humanities 
participants to explore any qualitative similarities and differences in the two groups. All 
quotations below are reported using pseudonyms. 
Results 
The results are presented below, organized under the two themes that framed the analysis. There 
are extended verbatim quotations, in order to show as transparently as possible (given the 
limitations of any intersubjective dialogue) their perceptions and arguments. 
Theme 1: Rationales for views: different kinds of evidence  
Respondents varied with respect to the kinds of evidence they invoked in support of their beliefs. 
The evidence referred to by respondents in explaining their views fell into five major categories, 
which are used below to organize the responses. 
Scientific research 
In keeping with their experience and education in the methods of scientific inquiry, many science 
graduates’ responses referred directly to the desirability of scientific testing in relation to health 
care initiatives. Specifically mentioned was a need for ‘empirical evidence’: 
Conventional medicine is based on a methodology which is rigorous... based on 
empirical evidence... If I had a serious illness I’d go the conventional medical way. If 
that wasn’t proving to be successful, then one would perhaps be tempted to look at other 
approaches. […] the process that a drug has to go through before it gets onto the market 
is really quite rigorous. You know, double blinded tests and you know phase trials and 
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from my understanding of it is that first of all you look at a drug and see if it’s got any 
side effects if you give it to healthy people and then from there on is a fairly rigorous 
program involving large numbers of people testing the effectiveness of the drug. 
(Bonnie, Science Graduate (SG)) 
Respondents also saw value in repeated trials, something they clearly viewed as more 
convincing in terms of evidence, and as part and parcel of EBM approaches to health care: 
Until you do all the studies all the... medicine goes through, amazing amount of studies 
and you know trials and things they have to go through before they can actually say, 
“Yes this pill will do this” and have minimal side effects um... yeah the alternative 
medicine field hasn’t really been put under such rigorous scrutiny. (Dylan, SG) 
Consistent with this, CAMs were seen as lacking in this respect since it was deemed they 
had not undergone such rigorous testing and thus lacked proof of efficacy: “I think herbal 
medicines are... perhaps not quite quantified enough and not scientifically studied enough” 
(Evan, SG). 
Some of the science-educated respondents dismissed CAMs as akin to superstition, and 
likely to result in dire consequences: 
...So if you want to go out and grind up in that way and put it on your warts or your 
sunspots, be prepare to accept the consequences rather than give science the opportunity 
to go through the comprehensive and in-depth testing...I do not think that herbal 
medicine at this point in time we know enough about to confidently apply them. (Brad, 
SG) 
Respondents expressed apprehension about using CAMS that had not undergone rigorous 
testing, and felt that CAMs lacked evidence of efficacy: 
…other alternatives, homeopathy, acupuncture, chiropractor again, they don’t undergo 
the sort of rigorous scientific testing that normal medicine does. So I would be quite 
nervous about using those …I’m a firm believer of anything that’s going to be tried on 
me has undergone testing rigorously…Yes...I do know that they must employ the 
scientific method to test these drugs. (Sarah, SG)  
The respondents routinely referred to the ‘scientific method’, where scientists ostensibly 
adhere to a set methodological approach to gather evidence, an approach deemed superior to 
‘anecdotal evidence’: 
It’s pretty hard to refute [scientific method] as a method for evaluating any sort of 
treatment I think because it’s rational, that’s the logical way of doing it, you can use 
large numbers of people; you let the numbers establish the effectiveness of any 
treatment …I’ve a friend whose whole career just about, is these alternative 
medicines… he obviously got enough of a result from his patients to continue to believe 
in it, but that’s anecdotal, really. If you’re looking again at large scale research support, 
there isn’t any as far as I know... (Tommy, SG) 
Although the humanities participants did not generally refer as explicitly to scientific 
methods such as double blind trials as an evidence base, several also considered there was a need 
for scientifically rigorous testing for CAMs:  
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the idea of herbal treatments you know, is really, again just needing more scientific 
rigour and more institutional rigour in making sure that all the boxes are ticked before 
medicines are released to the public (Kyle, Humanities Graduate (HG)) 
Interestingly, even the rigorous testing regimes did not mean that such evidence should be 
deemed irrefutable, but the concern seems to be related to long-term potential side effects not 
being picked up during such rigorous testing, rather than thinking CAMS were superior:  
Medical drugs have been subject to rigorous testing...That doesn't mean they're fool 
proof though… they test them on animals and then they do human trials and then they 
eventually let them out on the wider populace if they haven't had any serious problems 
with them, but sometimes conventional medical drugs can be publicly available for a 
whole generation before they realised it actually caused some horrible consequence… I 
suppose the testing is not just to prevent side effects or death, but also to test that they 
work… otherwise the government wouldn't allow them to be sold as a conventional 
drug as opposed to a herbal remedy. (Kate, HG) 
These respondents, like their scientific-educated counterparts, saw research about drug 
efficacy as key, something they felt meant the EBM drugs were likely more reliable: 
I think so much research is put in to medical side of things, which makes you…which 
makes me think that they’re more trustworthy, but then I suppose on other hand you 
can’t completely disregard herbal medicines because they may have the benefits. (Steph, 
HG) 
A consistent theme was that CAMs needed to be tested in the same way as EBM drugs if 
they were to be seen as efficacious: 
they should go through the same similar strength of testing because it is just fair. I mean 
you can't assess two different things for the same outcome and use different standards. 
(Leslie, HG) 
The notion of evidence was seen in stark terms; we either have the evidence or we don’t – 
with evidence here conceptualized in scientific terms: 
I mean if it’s the case of people putting their trust in various things, you would expect 
that that trust is based on something. …it seems to me either you have rigorous 
standards for this sort of thing or you don’t. (Doug, HG) 
Personal experience 
Somewhat in contrast to the above lauding of the value of using scientific method/s as the only 
reasonable evidence for the evaluation of conventional drugs and CAMs, several respondents 
from both science and humanities backgrounds reported using a range of CAMs such as 
hypnotherapy, acupuncture, naturopathy and so forth. They justified this choice in part on the 
results of personal experience. Some science respondents were cautiously open to the efficacy of 
homeopathy based on positive personal experiences (I=Interviewer; R=respondent): 
I: Has that personal experience actually made homeopathy more convincing? 
R: It has, but in my mind, I don’t have the evidence to justify the weight loss and there 
are so many other contributing factors apart from the homeopathy drops that I’ll never 
know whether or not they did have an effect. (Pat, SG) 
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Another participant cited personal experience of the CAM actually achieving the result 
desired, cessation of smoking: 
R: I stopped smoking by hypnotherapy… I tried to give up, I tried for about three 
years... really tried and had a bet with my mates and I bought every single thing that was 
on the market and I tried acupuncture as well. Acupuncture didn’t work for me but 
hypnotherapy worked… One twenty minute session. Never touched a smoke since and I 
used to be two packets a day... (Dylan, SG) 
In contrast, on the basis of his personal experiences, George (HG) described Bach flower 
herbal remedies as “a joke”: 
R: I was about 20…someone advised me to see a homeopath… he gave me the Bach 
remedies. And I realised after a while that it was basically an elaborate sort of con.  
Anecdotal evidence 
Anecdotal evidence was frequently cited as a reason for belief in particular health interventions. 
Some of the science respondents appeared to be willing to give credence to anecdotal accounts as 
a source of evidence for health care treatments. For example, despite his strong endorsement of a 
scientific evidence base, Tommy also invoked anecdotal claims as ‘good evidence’ in support of 
his views on hypnotherapy: 
I know people who gave up smoking after they had hypnotherapy. I don’t know what 
the effect is, I don’t know how hypnotherapy works, but it worked for them. So that’s 
good evidence…that’s people that I know, one minute they're smoking and the next they 
are not. (Tommy, SG) 
Other respondents with science training also invoked reported anecdotal evidence, albeit 
with caveats, when discussing their views on CAMs. This anecdotal evidence suggested they 
would at least be open to trying CAMs, when other approaches failed. There is an element of ‘it’s 
worth a try’ when conventional EBM approaches haven’t worked, meaning there’s not a lot to 
lose: 
R: People I know who have acupuncture swear by it. I don’t have acupuncture but if I 
felt there was enough need I might. So if people tell you about something from their, 
you know, anecdotal experiences about something that for you counts as… 
I: Evidence? 
R: Evidence. I would be likely to investigate it further (Bea, SG) 
The humanities graduates frequently referred to similar anecdotal accounts, as exemplified 
by Steph’s explanation of her willingness to try homeopathy: “I’ve definitely like heard about it 
and its benefits and it’s something that I’ll be willing to try” (Steph, HG). 
Respondents referred rather tentatively to anecdotal evidence in justifying their views on 
hypnotism, but expressed reservations about accepting anecdotal accounts as real ‘evidence’ 
more broadly: 
R: Well, I guess it’s only anecdotal that I’ve heard of people who have given up 
smoking after being hypnotised. 
I: Yeah, this is second hand evidence in a sense, yeah? 
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R: Yeah, yeah…. I don’t have the evidence before me. All I can do is guess at what I 
think is most likely. (George, HG) 
It seems that the respondents did not view such evidence as being quite the same as EBMs, 
somewhat qualifying their answers: “I have some hearsay evidence that hypnosis is fairly 
powerful but this question says there is good evidence… I don't know” (Jim, SG). 
Media and general reading 
Similar to the notion of reported anecdotal evidence from associates or friends, in some cases the 
media and general reading was deemed a form of ‘evidence’ for respondents from both 
educational backgrounds: 
I: Do you have any experience of acupuncture…? 
R: No, I only read about it. I have all the books, the atlas of it and stuff like that. I mean 
I've seen documentaries, but no, no other experience. 
I: But they were quite convincing were they, the documentaries? 
N: Yeah, they were. (Naomi, SG) 
Open-mindedness again surfaced, and a combination of past experience, anecdotes and 
media reports seemed to sway some respondents to consider the use of CAMs: 
R: I used to grow herbs and be very interested in the medicinal values and purposes…I 
read a lot about natural medicines and a number of my friends went into that area. So I 
think there is definitely a lot more in it. (Kerrie, HG) 
Historical Use of CAMs 
Some respondents, again from both science and humanities backgrounds, also cited the long 
history of use of CAMs as reasons for their views, along with obvious respect for medical 
traditions of other cultures: 
R: I think it's an old method and there is a lot of accumulated wisdom into doing that. So 
based on that, really, not based on any scientific evidence or anything [...] For example 
Chinese medicine, it has years and years of wisdom of practice, but just because they 
are in the forefront these medical drugs, you know they are very famous, 
pharmaceuticals from them you know, so I don’t think they are better because they are 
more tested. (Naomi, SG) 
There was apparent impatience with the perceived arrogance of Western dominance of 
modern medicine and treatments, along with the notion that some modern medicines have their 
origins in different cultures or settings: 
R: We’ve got – over 2,000 years’ worth of Chinese medicine you can’t just ignore it, it’s 
going to be good and a lot of these herbal medicines that, for example, they used to have 
come across, and this is still used today quite effectively in standard medicine. (Paul, 
SG) 
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This notion of respect for non-Western cultures was echoed in other comments, where the 
long history of Asian medicine, particularly with regard to herbal remedies, was seen as too 
important to ignore: 
We are probably in terms of Western medicines applying scientific principles that are 
fairly recent and I think we can learn a great deal from oriental medicine – and I'm not 
being specific with Chinese – I believe oriental medicine which is lasted for thousands 
and thousands of years and similarly aboriginal medicine. (Brad, SG) 
Summary of Findings for Theme 1 
In summary, in relation to theme one, there was no indication from the participants of either a 
critical acceptance of CAMs or outright rejection of EBM. Respondents from both scientific and 
non-scientific educational backgrounds talked of a need for scientific rigor and wide-scale testing 
of medicines in general (including CAMs) to establish their safety and efficacy. Similarly, 
respondents from both science and non-science backgrounds reported trying a range of CAMs, 
but in contrast to the oft repeated references to the desirability of testing efficacy, simultaneously 
seemed to be willing to accept reported anecdotal evidence and history of use as counting for 
something in these kinds of decisions. Despite typically holding the view that there is no 
scientific support for the efficacy of CAMs, the use of such treatments was not dismissed, but it 
seemed to be confined to circumstances in which there was not a lot to lose; that is, when EBM 
approaches had failed. 
Theme 2: Habits of Mind 
The coded data from the interviews related to several of habits of mind as defined by Çalik and 
Coll (2012), which are summarized below. 
Objectivity 
If defined in this context as strict adherence to tenets of EBM, then none of the participants 
expressed this consistently. As is evident from the quotations above, different forms of subjective 
anecdotal evidence were cited by respondents, including several with science training. One of the 
science respondents explicitly recognized her own bias towards the medical profession: 
Yeah, that’s my own sort of bias I guess. I think that... yeah the medical ones are sort of 
peer reviewed more than herbal medicines are. By the medical and scientific community 
– I think that’s my bias ‘cos I come from there. (Fiona, SG) 
Mistrust of Authority 
There were very few science respondents who expressed mistrust of authority in relation to 
mainstream health provision, which relates coherently to the acceptance by the science 
respondents of the value and worth of scientific testing outlined above. One of the science 
respondents did not trust the quality of the service provided by mainstream doctors, contrasting 
this unfavourably with homeopaths: 
And that’s where the homeopathy... they tend to look more at the whole person and they 
tend to... delve a little bit deeper than just the surface, because today… lots of the 
doctors, they have to get five patients through in an hour…and they just prescribe, 
prescribe, prescribe… whereas your homeopathic medicines, they actually need to 
understand the person so that they can address the underlying issues, not just the 
superficial issues. (Dylan, SG) 
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Paul (SG) provided a slightly different example of this particular habit of mind, mistrusting 
some claims of the medical industry because of suspicions about the motivations of the 
claimants: 
I think it comes back to this medical industry driving it, and then what research is done; 
and a lot of testing is done by the people that are manufacturing the stuff.  
Mistrust of the motivations of mainstream medical authority was also expressed by one of 
the humanities respondents, Anna, who argued that people are more likely to place blind trust in 
conventional medicine than in CAMs: 
I: So what do you think about the possibility of somebody setting themselves up as a, 
you know, herbalist or a naturopath or whatever and selling things…when actually 
there’s no evidence that it’s going to do any good? 
R: I think one needs to put a little bit more trust in people because I think we tend to 
find that there is a lot of intelligent, you know, people that choose those things, actually 
spend a lot of time thinking about it and researching it. And the people that go to 
conventional medicine don’t, and they go there blindly trusting without knowing; and 
even I know that’s a generalisation, and obviously there’s always a chance that someone 
would get sucked into something that isn’t genuine. But, you know, my experience of 
the people that seek alternative medicine is that they don’t go there with that open trust 
of “please fix me”, like they would on a modern, you know, in a conventional doctor. 
(Anna, HG) 
While not expressing mistrust of the motives of the medical industry directly, two of the 
humanities respondents ostensibly mistrusted both the efficacy of current testing regimes, and the 
extent to which they felt some doctors were informed about the medicines they were prescribing:  
I don’t think the standards applied to conventional medicine are high enough…I think 
that some medicines come on the market and 20 years later, the long-term effects are 
discovered. So, there should be greater standards of monitoring for those, and herbal 
medicines should have those greater standards as well. (George, HG) 
I don’t think doctors know a lot about medicine. They do very little study in the 
pharmacology… So I think they are probably pretty uninformed about medicines in 
general let alone the natural medicines. (Kerrie, HG) 
Open Mindedness 
Open mindedness to CAMs was apparent across respondents from both the sciences and 
humanities backgrounds. This in a way reflects a suspension of disbelief in CAMs, with the 
argument commonly being that they might work but that we just do not know enough about 
them, hence cannot disprove them as legitimate ways to treat illness. This argument appears to 
relate to the provisional nature of scientific knowledge expressed by many of the science 
respondents: 
Just as in any branch of science they don’t already have the answers… therefore you 
can’t be dismissive of alternatives unless you’ve proven them to be wrong. (Tommy, 
SG) 
QUINN, TAYLOR, COLL, MCCLUNE  
 
 
13 
I think there are certain things in medicine that we just haven’t yet explored. And if I 
have a serious illness and I was told a certain thing by medic guys and GPs, I still would 
explore any other avenue I could. (Pat, SG) 
Although I’m from a science background I’m still open minded, no one has all the 
answers so... we should always consider all the possibilities no matter how, low 
percentage chance of success there might be, but just put it on the table but not 
necessarily do it. (Anthony, SG) 
Similarly, some of the humanities respondents suggested that science does not have all the 
answers, and thus according to them this means we can learn from alternatives: 
Medicine plays a big part in certainly improving, you know, health due to the science, 
however, a lot of the science also comes from natural remedies and things like the, you 
know, the Brazilian rain forest probably have a lot of things that could yield to us. 
Things like ayurvedic medicine [a Sanskrit-based holistic view of disease and treatment] 
in Sri Lanka and India. I believe they are probably based on some very good medical 
background in relation to the herbs they use. So, yeah, I think we have a lot to learn 
from indigenous societies and also just other societies in relation to natural medicines… 
it probably doesn’t have the rigorous studies behind it. That does not mean that it does 
not work though. (Kerrie, HG) 
That doesn’t mean that I think that there is anything wrong with conventional 
treatments. But yeah, it just means that it doesn’t have all the answers… (George, HG) 
Scepticism  
Some respondents from science and humanities backgrounds expressed skepticism about the 
claims of conventional medicine: 
I would always be very cautious about taking drugs of any sort. I know that there are 
times, but it would be – I would see it as something that was in extreme situation and for 
a short time and that you would always be looking for other approaches, other methods 
and ways because, again, if you’re taking that and you don’t know what you’re really 
dealing with… if I was well and conscious enough, I will be reading it, researching it, 
and I’d be extremely cautious about taking it. (Anna, HG) 
Similarly, skepticism about the efficacy of CAMs was apparent in some respondents, 
including humanities graduates: 
R: It’s not the one where they give you tiny little drops of stuff is it? 
I: That’s the ones where they give you tiny little drops of stuff and – 
R: Right, right. (Ironically laughs): It’s a flawed understanding I think of the way 
humans react to things. (Kyle, HG) 
Interestingly, some skepticism about alternative approaches was evident even for those 
reportedly using CAMs: 
Medical science researchers aren’t stupid and neither are the pharmaceutical companies 
– if they had fallen upon an alternative approach that was successful then surely that 
would be in the domain…. It seems to me just a little bit of hocus pocus there and I 
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mean there is a huge amount of money involved in all of this and the public at large 
spend vast sums every year buying herbal remedies and we are I suppose, herbal 
gullible in that respect. I do take... glucosamine sulfate in the belief that it is going to 
stop my knees from running out because I do a bit of running…(Bonnie, SG). 
Rationality 
All the respondents offered rational arguments for their views, as is apparent in many of the 
quotations outlined above. One of the humanities respondents (Anna) held arational beliefs in the 
metaphysical belief system espoused by Steiner philosophy. However, within the bounds of this 
arational point of reference her arguments were eminently rational:  
R: I think conventional medicine is wonderful and it does fantastic things in certain 
areas – in lots of areas, but then equally, in lots of others, it can’t – I don’t feel it can 
sort of touch it because it’s working only on the physical level, so it’s assuming that you 
only have a physical body. And, for me, it’s not that simple …  I would say that we have 
a physical body, an etheric body, an astral body and an ego, so all those combinations of 
bodies working together in a human being can come across all sorts of problems and 
conflict. So if you’re just dealing with the physical body, modern science medicine is 
fantastic. But, unfortunately, there’s lots of other influences and issues that come up that 
it can’t, you know? So, you know, I’m not anti-modern medicine at all, it’s just knowing 
when it’s the right time to use it. (Anna, HG) 
In summary, in relation to theme two, the ‘scientific’ habits of mind proposed by Gauld 
(1982) and as employed more recently by Çalik and Coll (2012), were expressed by a range of 
scientifically and non-scientifically trained participants in this study.  
Discussion 
Regarding the first research question about different kinds of evidence, tertiary science education 
does not seem to have made a qualitative difference to the way that participants in this study 
engaged with evidence about CAMs. Respondents with tertiary science training and those 
without it alike used subjective kinds of evidence in justifying their views and decisions about 
CAMs. This suggests that regardless of the place of evidence-based medicine in health policy, 
interpretivist views of what counts as evidence for CAMs (e.g., Barry 2006; Goldenberg 2006, 
2010; Loughlin et al. 2010; Upshur et al. 2001) are being used by the general public, even by 
people (like Tommy) who understand and are deeply committed to the principles of EBM. 
We would argue along the lines of Bailin, Case, Coombs and Daniels (1999) and Ennis 
(1993) that what is needed is the kind of critical thinking that allows health consumers to assess 
the credibility of the different kinds of evidence relevant to CAMs. We concur with the argument 
of Kolstø (2001) that mutual understanding concerning the advantages and limitations of 
scientific and anecdotal kinds of evidence is necessary. We would also emphasize that this 
understanding is not possible without a deep understanding of the scientific method as applied to 
EBM, as well as clear understanding and acknowledgement of its limitations. But what to make 
of people like Tommy and Dylan, who despite criticizing the lack of a strong scientific evidence-
base for CAMs, have tried them or accept anecdotal evidence for their worth? This may well 
relate to the habit of mind of open-mindedness, which is more or less equivalent to suspension of 
disbelief – the flip side of suspension of belief: if something has not been disproved then it 
should not be discounted. However, further research into this finding would be of value. 
So what does all this mean for science education, both at school and higher education? It 
highlights, as pointed out by Kolstø (2001), the importance of background knowledge, including 
knowledge about the nature of science and scientific knowledge. It also points to the need for 
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explicit teaching about the epistemology of science, including an ability to assess quality of data 
and adjudicate between different interpretations of data (Ryder 2002). To this end it provides yet 
more reason for incorporating into both school and university science education the kind of 
dialogic reasoning and argumentation, using case-based socio-scientific issues to allow students 
to experience the nature of science and develop scientific literacy advocated for some years by a 
range of researchers (e.g., Zeidler, Sadler, Simmons, and Howes 2005). 
However, scientific literacy, and understanding of the nature of science are not enough – 
also important is the relationship of the science to belief systems and habits of mind. As pointed 
out by Lederman (1992), developing an understanding of the nature of science is not a simple 
matter and conceptualization of science is mediated by religious and other belief systems (see 
also Zeidler, Walker, Ackett, and Simmons 2002). Moreover, these belief systems, especially at 
the level of metaphysical paradigms as expressed by Anna, may be extremely resistant to change 
(Johnson 2011). 
As argued by Johnson (2011), education should encourage students to explicitly re-examine 
and redefine their beliefs, and this may be particularly fruitful in the context of science education, 
where belief systems can filter the kinds of knowledges and information valued by science 
educators. This could help make more visible to students the relationship between the specifics of 
the science and their beliefs in a given teaching and learning context.  
This leads us to the second research question about the ways in which people engage with 
the evidence relating to CAMs. Anna’s strong commitment to CAMs reflected her belief in the 
fourfold anthroposophical view of humans that was held in conjunction with a strong 
commitment to mainstream science. Her accommodation of a paranormal belief system and 
conventional science; of exercising rationality within an a-rational framework, is fundamentally 
parallel to scientists accommodating rationality within an overarching a-rational more 
mainstream faith-based framework (see e.g., Coll, Taylor, and Lay 2009). So, conventional 
scientific testing of the physical effects of CAMs is not in a sense relevant to the paranormal 
aspects of Anna’s framework for health care decisions. Hence it is unlikely that anything science 
can show will change her views while she holds those beliefs.  
As belief in the paranormal has been shown to be negatively correlated with analytical 
cognitive style (Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, and Fugelsang 2012), future research might 
fruitfully explore the relationship of this cognitive style to rationality, the extent to which 
deploying an analytical cognitive style can be facilitated in relation to socio-scientific issues, or 
under what conditions it might be expressed, taught and practiced. 
Furthermore, the results of this study suggest that the term ‘scientific habits of mind’ may be 
misleading in its implication that these habits of mind are particular to science (as noted by 
Gauld). We could not establish qualitatively different ways of thinking in terms of the ‘habits of 
mind’ specific to respondents who had tertiary science training. This supports the previous 
contention by Gauld (1982) that the habits of mind explored in this study are not specifically the 
province of science specialists. These results raise important questions for science education 
about whether there is anything special about ways of thinking and engaging with evidence 
scientifically that separates it from critical thinking applied in other spheres of endeavor. If so 
what is it, how do we put our finger on it and most importantly how do we communicate it to our 
students and to the public? 
Hence, there is a need for further studies, to try to tease out the relationship between habits 
of mind, understandings of scientific literacy including the nature of science and their interplay 
with belief systems that people bring to health care decisions and other socio-scientific issues. It 
may also be valuable to undertake quantitative studies to explore whether there are quantitatively 
detectable trends, rather than qualitative differences, in the kinds of evidence that people with 
and without science backgrounds accept in relation to CAMs and the ways that they engage with 
that evidence.  
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Table 1: Participant background 
Pseudonym Profession Discipline Area 
Anthony Teacher Science 
Neville Teacher Science 
Andrew Teacher Science 
Bonnie Teacher Science 
Cheryl Teacher Science 
Dylan Teacher Science 
Evan Teacher Science 
Fiona Teacher Science 
Bea Retired teacher Science 
Tommy Lecturer Science 
Brad Lecturer Science 
Jim Lecturer Science 
Pat Lecturer Science 
Paul Lecturer Science 
Sarah PhD student Science 
Naomi PhD student Science 
Anna Teacher Humanities 
Wendy Teacher Humanities 
Leslie Pre-services teacher Humanities 
Stephanie Pre-services teacher Humanities 
Doug Lecturer Humanities 
Kerrie Lecturer Humanities 
Kyle Lecturer Humanities 
Kate Lecturer Humanities 
George Lecturer Humanities 
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